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Abstract
A well established dynamic model describing the impact of oligopolistic in-
teraction on a renewable resource is revisited here to illustrate its dual inter-
pretation as a waste removal diﬀerential game. The regulatory implications
are illustrated by assuming that the public agency may control market price
and possibly also access to the commons. Two diﬀerent formulations of the
managerial or CSR objective are envisaged, based on a combination of proﬁts
and either output or the individual share of the waste stock. It is shown that
if the representative ﬁrm’s objective includes the residual waste stock, there
exists a unique regulated price driving to zero the steady state stock itself.
Hence, the present analysis delivers some useful indications concerning an
appropriate deﬁnition of the CSR objective ﬁrms should adopt.
JEL Codes: C73, L13, Q20, Q53
Keywords: waste removal; resource extraction; feedback information;
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1 Introduction
Free access to the commons is the driver of the original formulation of the
tragedy in Gordon (1954) and Hardin (1968). This, in terms of oligopoly
games, directly translates into the question as to whether there might exist an
optimal industry structure, or, an optimal number of ﬁrms in the commons.
The analysis of this problem can be traced back to Cornes et al. (1986),
Mason et al. (1988) and Mason and Polasky (1997, 2002).
What follows presents in a single model the impact of oligopolistic in-
teraction on a renewable resource and a waste stock via a diﬀerential game
approach. The idea that originated this paper stems from an elementary
analogy between the exploitation of a renewable natural resource and waste
removal, provided the dynamics according to which these two magnitudes
grow over time can be assumed to be exogenously given and identical. The
issue at stake, then, boils down to the following: if the state is a natural re-
source or species, in line of principle it would be desirable to have the largest
possible stock of it left at the steady state, while the opposite holds if the
state variable consists of waste. Hence, the policy implications of the ensuing
analysis will be opposite in the two cases.
In building up the model, I will pose that ﬁrms deﬁne their individual
objective functions attaching a positive weight to their output levels or har-
vest rates or, alternatively, to the individual symmetric share of the stock.
That is, a ﬁrm’s objective function is deﬁned as a combination of proﬁts and
either the control or the state variable. One way or the other, this approach,
in the light of the typical interpretation deriving from an established view
in the theory of industrial organization, amounts to saying that ﬁrms have
separated ownership from control via delegation contracts to managers à la
Vickers (1985). However, also in this respect one can spot a dual nature of
this additional feature, whereby if the common pool is a stock of waste then
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maximising a combination of proﬁts and output reveals the adoption of a
CSR stance by the same ﬁrms.1
For the sake of simplicity, in the remainder I will quite freely refer to
the state variable as a renewable resource or a waste stock, and specify the
relevant interpretation of the state when it comes to evaluating the conse-
quences of ﬁrms’ behaviour, and therefore also the design of an appropriate
regulation.
In particular, if the state measures a stock of waste, the ensuing analysis
shows that including the state in the maximand is deﬁnitely preferable to
the alternative based on a combination of proﬁts and individual output (or
waste removal). This is because under this speciﬁcation of the model the
regulator avails of a unique regulated price which drives to zero the residual
stock associated to any stable equilibria arising under feedback information.
The structure of the paper is the following. The basic setup is laid out in
section 2. The ﬁrst version, where the CSR or managerial objective features
the output level, is fully characterised in section 3, including the unregulated
open-loop, linear and nonlinear feedback solutions as well as the regulated
feedback game. Section 4 accounts for the linear and nonlinear feedback
solutions of the alternative model, for the regulated case only. Plausible
extensions and concluding remarks are in section 5.
2 The setup
The setup is an extension of Lambertini andMantovani (2014) and Benchekroun
(2008), where a common property productive asset oligopoly is considered,
and encompasses the duopoly model used in Benchekroun (2003) and Fuji-
1This analogy between strategic delegation and corporate social responsibility has al-
ready beeen highlighted in the literature. See Laambertini and Tampieri (2015) and the
references therein.
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wara (2008). The model illustrates a diﬀerential oligopoly game of resource
extraction unravelling over continuous time t ∈ [0,∞) . The market is sup-
plied by n ≥ 1 ﬁrms2 producing a homogeneous good, whose inverse demand
function is p = a − Q at any time t, with Q =
n
i=1 qi. Firms share the
same technology, characterised by the cost function Ci = cq
2
i in which pa-
rameter c ∈ (0, a) is constant over time. Firms operate without any ﬁxed
costs. During production, each ﬁrm exploits a renewable natural resource,
whose accumulation is governed by the following dynamics:
·
S = F (S)−Q (1)
with
F (S) =


δS ∀S ∈ (0, Sy]
δSy

Smax − S
Smax − Sy

∀S ∈ (Sy, Smax]
(2)
where S is the resource stock, δ > 0 is its implicit growth rate when the stock
is at most equal to Sy and δSy is the maximum sustainable yield. Taken
together, (1-2) imply that (i) if the resource stock is suﬃciently small the
population grows at an exponential rate; and (ii) beyond Sy, the asset grows
at a decreasing rate. Moreover, Smax is the carrying capacity of the habitat,
beyond which the growth rate of the resource is negative, being limited by
available amounts of food and space. In the remainder, we will conﬁne our
attention to the case in which F (S) = δS.3
Firms play noncooperatively and choose their respective outputs simulta-
neously at every instant. At t = 0, each ﬁrm hires a manager whose contract
2Under monopoly the delegation to managers would not be operated by stockholders,
but CSR could be adopted, so I’m intentionally not ruling out the monopoly case. Another
good reason not to do so pops up in section 4.
3As in Benchekroun and Long (2002), Fujiwara (2008) and Tornell and Velasco (1992),
among several others.
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speciﬁes the instantaneous objective which the manager has to maximise.
Delegation contracts are observable. As in Vickers (1985), the delegation
contract establishes that the instantaneous objective function of manager i
is a linear combination of proﬁts and output:4
Mi = πi + θqi (3)
in which θ determines the relevance of output in the ﬁrm’s objective.
An alternative approach consists in supposing that the CSR managerial
incentive is
Mi = πi − θ ·
S
n
(4)
where θ is a weight attached to the individual symmetric share of the stock.
Intuitively, θ > 0 seems appropriate if the state is a stock of waste. In both
cases, θ is treated as a constant and is symmetric across the population of
ﬁrms.
The i-th manager maximises the following discounted payoﬀ ﬂow
Ωi =
 ∞
0
Mie
−ρtdt, (5)
under the constraint posed by the state equation
·
S = δS −Q (6)
Parameter ρ > 0 is the discount rate, common to all managers and con-
stant over time. Obviously, if θ = 0, ﬁrms behave as pure proﬁt-seeking
entrepreneurial units.
The analysis will be carried out under the following assumption:
4This contract is equivalent to that considered in Fershtman and Judd (1987) and
Sklivas (1987), where the maximand is a weighted average of proﬁts and revenues, Mi =
απi + (1− α)Ri, Ri = pqi. A proof of the equivalence is in Lambertini and Trombetta
(2002).
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Assumption 1 δ > ρ [n (n+ 2c) + 1] / [2 (1 + c)] .
This guarantees the positivity of the residual resource stock at the steady
state under any feedback rules. That is, in the remainder I will leave the
possibility of resource exhaustion due to an excessively large number of ﬁrms
out of the picture, in order to focus solely on the eﬀects of delegation.
In the remainder of the paper, I will refer to the game relying on (3) as
model I, while that using (4) will be model II.
3 Model I
Here, delegation (or the adoption of a CSR stance) has the same structure as
in Vickers (1985), the instantaneous managerial objective being (3). A few
words will suﬃce to capture the essence of the open-loop solution, which,
for several reasons, is of limited interest. In the remainder of this section, I
will pose σ ≡ a + θ for the sake of simplicity. If ﬁrms don’t internalise the
consequences of their behaviour at any time and play the individual (static)
Cournot-Nash output
qCN =
σ
n+ 1 + 2c
(7)
at all times, then the residual amount of the natural resource in steady state
is SCN = nσ/ [δ (n+ 1 + 2c)] = QCN/δ. As the remainder of the analysis is
about to show, it is worth noting that the static solution corresponds to the
open-loop steady state one, which in this game is unstable (see below). Let
the initial condition be S (0) = S0 > 0. The relevance of the size of S0 on the
ﬁnal resource stock as well as on the stability of solutions will be discussed
in the ensuing analysis.
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3.1 The linear feedback solution
The game can be solved under feedback rules conjecturing a linear-quadratic
value function with unknown coeﬃcients to be determined solving the result-
ing system of equations to determine coeﬃcients, or following an alternative
but equivalent procedure consisting in solving the relevant ﬁrst order condi-
tion w.r.t. the partial derivative of the value function. For reasons which will
become evident below, here I take the latter route. The Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation writes as:
ρVi (S) = max
qi
[(σ −Q+ cqi) qi + V
′
i (S) (δS −Q)] (8)
where Vi (S) is the ﬁrm i’s value function; and V
′
i (S) = ∂Vi (S) /∂S. The
ﬁrst order condition (FOC) on qi is
σ − 2 (1 + c) qi −
	
j =i
qj − V
′
i (S) = 0 (9)
In view of the ex ante symmetry across ﬁrms, one can impose the sym-
metry conditions qi = q (S) and Vi (S) = V (S) for all i and solve FOC (9)
to obtain
V ′ (S) = σ − [n+ 1 + 2c] q (10)
Substituting this into (8) yields an identity in S. Diﬀerentiating both sides
with respect to S and rearranging terms, any feedback strategy is implicitly
given by the following diﬀerential equation:
q′(S) =
(δ − ρ) [σ − (n+ 1 + 2c) q (S)]
σ (n− 1) + δ(n+ 1 + 2c)S − 2 [n2 + c (2n− 1)] q (S)
, (11)
which must hold together with terminal condition lim t→∞e
−ρtV (s) = 0. Ex-
amining expression (11) reveals that
q′(S) = 0⇔ q0 (S) =
σ
n+ 1 + 2c
= 
q (12)
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q′(S)→ ±∞⇔ q∞ (S) =
σ (n− 1) + δ(n+ 1 + 2c)S
2 [n2 + c (2n− 1)]
(13)
Then, assuming that the extraction strategy is a linear function of the stock
at any time, I assume q (S) = α+ βS, whereby (11) is satisﬁed by any pair
(α, β) solving the following system:
σ [β (n− 1)− δ + ρ] + α [(n+ 1 + 2c) (δ − ρ)− 2 (n2 + c (2n− 1)) β] = 0
β [(n+ 1 + 2c) (2δ − ρ)− 2 (n2 + c (2n− 1)) β] = 0
(14)
System (14) is solved by the pairs
α1 = −
σ [2δ (1 + c)− ρ (n (n+ 2c) + 1)]
2δ (n+ 1 + 2c) [n2 + c (2n− 1)]
; β
1
=
(n+ 1 + 2c) (2δ − ρ)
n2 [n2 + c (2n− 1)]
(15)
α2 =
σ
n+ 1 + 2c
; β
2
= 0 (16)
so that the individual equilibrium output is
qLF (S) = α1 + β1S (17)
qOL = α2 =
σ
n+ 1 + 2c
(18)
where superscripts LF and OL stand for linear feedback and open-loop,
respectively. That is, since the game is a linear state one by construction, one
of the linear feedback strategies generated by the HJB equation degenerate
in the open-loop one, coinciding with the static Cournot-Nash solution.5 The
expression on the r.h.s. of (17) belongs to [0, σ/ (n+ 1 + 2c)] for all
S ∈

σ [n (n+ 2c) + 1]
δ (n+ 1 + 2c)2
,
σ [2 (1 + c) δ − ρ (n (n+ 2c) + 1)]
(n+ 1 + 2c)2 (2δ − ρ) δ

(19)
If q = qLF (S) , the steady state level of the natural resource stock is
SLF =
nσ [2 (1 + c) δ − ρ (n (n+ 2c) + 1)]
δ (n+ 1 + 2c) [2c (δ − nρ) + n (2δ − ρ (n+ 1))]
> 0 (20)
5For moere on classes of diﬀerential games in which the open-loop solution is sub-
game perfect (or strongly time consistent), see Dockner et al. (1985), Fershtman (1987),
Mehlmann (1988), Dockner et al. (2000) and Cellini et al. (2005).
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for all values of δ satisfying Assumption 1. It is evident that ∂SLF/∂θ > 0
since ∂SLF/∂σ > 0. That is,
Lemma 1 At the linear feedback equilibrium, any increase in the extent of
delegation increases the residual stock of resources in steady state.
If instead q = qOL, the steady state level of the natural resource stock
associated with open-loop strategies is
SOL =
nσ
δ (n+ 1 + 2c)
> 0 (21)
everywhere.
Solutions qOL and qLF (S) , together with the locus
·
S = 0, are repre-
sented in the space (q, S) in Figure 1, where arrows illustrate the dynamics
of variables and the stability of qLF (S) , as opposed to the instability of the
open-loop solution qOL. If ﬁrms adopt this strategy, the resource stock is
bound to shrink to zero for all S0 < S
OL. Otherwise, for all S0 > S
OL, the
stock will grow beyond Sy, not represented along the horizontal axis of Figure
1. Hence, under open-loop rules, the ultimate destiny of the natural resource
depends on initial conditions. It is also worth stressing that ∂SOL/∂θ > 0,
which implies that the interval of initial conditions leading to resource ex-
tinction under open-loop (or quasi-static) strategies expands in the extent of
managerial delegation.
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Figure 1 Open-loop and linear feedback solutions in the (S, q) space

 S(0, 0)
q
·
S = 0
qOL
qLF (S)
SLF SOL






































 










3.2 Nonlinear feedback equilibria
The present game produces inﬁnitely many nonlinear feedback solutions
whose continuum can be fully characterised using the same procedure as
in Lambertini (2016a) and Lambertini and Mantovani (2016), which in turn
relies on Rowat’s (2007).6 Without replicating the entire analysis of the non-
linear case, here it suﬃces to characterise the degenerate nonlinear solution
identiﬁed by the tangency between the highest isocline of the representative
6Nonlinear feedback solutions have been investigated in oligopoly theory, environmental
and resource economics and other ﬁelds. See Tsutsui and Mino (1990), Shimomura (1991),
Dockner and Sorger (1996), Itaya and Shimomura (2001), Rubio and Casino (2002) and
Colombo and Labrecciosa (2015), inter alia.
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ﬁrm and the locus
·
S = 0 in the state-control space.
To do so, one has to go back to (11) and note that the slope of the steady
state locus
·
S = 0 is
∂q (S)
∂S
 ·
S=0
=
δ
n
(22)
which must coincide with q′ (S) when q (S) = δS/n, in such a way that (11)
becomes:
δ
n
=
(δ − ρ) [nσ − δ (n+ 1 + 2c)S]
(n− 1) [nσ − δ (n+ 2c)S]
(23)
whose unique solution w.r.t. the state variable is
SNLT =
nσ (δ − nρ)
δ [2c (δ − nρ) + n (2δ − ρ (n+ 1))]
(24)
which is positive in the parameter range wherein SLF > 0. The associated
individual output is qNLT = δSNLT/n. Superscript NLT mnemonics for
nonlinear tangency solution.
Figure 2 describes the evolution of state and control variables over time,
enabling one to single out the properties of any nonlinear feedback solutions,
including the very speciﬁc one generated by the tangency point with the
locus
·
S = 0 (point T in the ﬁgure). Figure 2 (which is nothing but a more
detailed version of Figure 1) also portrays the loci q′(S) = 0 (along which
q0 (S) = q
F1 (S) = qOL) and q′(S)→∞.
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Figure 2 Linear and nonlinear feedback solutions in the (S, q) space
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The arrows along the curve tangent to the locus
·
S = 0 in point T shows
that the tangency solution is indeed unstable. However, there exist inﬁnitely
many solutions identiﬁed by the intersections along the segment delimited
by points T and LF . This set of stable nonlinear solutions, which can be
labelled as SNLS, is sensitive to the extent of delegation θ, which aﬀects the
loci
·
S = 0 and qF2 (S) , and therefore also the position of the tangency point
T . The set SNLS has the size of such a segment:
SNLS =

(SNLT − SLF )2 + (qNLT − qLF )2 (25)
Using the corresponding expressions for the steady state values of state and
control, one obtains SNLS = σ

Φ (n, δ, ρ), with Φ (·) > 0. Consequently,
∂SNLS
∂θ
=

Φ (n, δ, ρ) > 0 (26)
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by the deﬁnition of σ. This boils down to the following:
Proposition 2 The separation between ownership and control via delega-
tion contracts based on output expansion enlarges the set of stable nonlinear
feedback solutions.
In particular, since ∂SNLT/∂θ > 0, the above proposition is accompanied
by a relevant corollary:
Corollary 3 The adoption of managerial incentives based on output expan-
sion increases the upper bound of the SNLS set.
This result can be rephrased to say that these particular type of man-
agerial incentives allows for a larger stock of the resource surviving in cor-
respondence of a nonlinear feedback solution, and prompts for the analysis
of the so-called voracity eﬀect (Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane,
1999), which can be brieﬂy summarised as follows. In line of principle, one
would expect that the higher the resource growth rate is, the higher should
be the volume of that resource in steady state. However, this may not hold
true as ﬁrms respond to any increase in the growth rate by hastening re-
source extraction, whereby one observes that ∂S/∂δ < 0 in steady state, at
least for suﬃciently high levels of δ. The arising of such voracity eﬀect has
been highlighted, with pure proﬁt-seeking units, in Benchekroun (2008) and
Lambertini and Mantovani (2014). As in Lambertini and Mantovani (2014,
p. 121), also here it can be easily shown that under linear and nonlinear
feedback information the voracity eﬀect operates.
Take the weighted average of SLF and SNLT :
S = φSLF + (1− φ)SNLT (27)
with φ ∈ [0, 1] . There emerges that ∂S/∂δ < 0 for suﬃciently high levels
of the growth rate δ, for any φ ∈ [0, 1] , thereby including the extremes of
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the relevant interval of resource stock volumes in steady state. However, this
property, combined with Lemma 1, Proposition 2 and Corollary 3, entails
Proposition 4 Managerial incentives allowing for output expansion soften
the voracity eﬀect over the entire interval of nonlinear feedback solutions
SNS.
It would be tempting to interpret this conclusion as implying a beneﬁcial
eﬀect of managerialization on resource preservation (or, an undesirable eﬀect
upon waste removal, in which case voracity is most welcome for intuitive rea-
sons). However, this would be hazardous as the same issue should indeed be
reassessed in presence of alternative incentive schemes, based for instance on
market shares (Jansen et al., 2007; Ritz, 2008) or comparative performance
evaluation (Salas Fumas, 1992; Miller and Pazgal, 2001). Yet, the possibility
that delegating control to agents interested in expanding production might
ultimately mitigate the pressure on the resource is a striking and unexpected
feature of the present model. This fact ﬁnds its explanation in the multiplica-
tive eﬀect of this form of delegation on equilibrium outputs and the resource
stock, as the delegation parameter θ appears in market size σ and makes it
larger as seen from the managers’ standpoint. Since σ is a at the same time a
measure of proﬁtability or demand level, this type of delegation (i) increases
the maximum mark-up from a− c to a− c+ θ or equivalently (ii) shifts the
demand upwards by θ. Consequently, the managerial inclination to expand-
ing output is routed in the direction of aﬀecting the mark-up level and this
mechanism operates as a partial remedy to voracity in the range where the
latter takes place. Therefore, albeit with some caution, this design of dele-
gation contracts - admittedly, far from being general - is of public interest
because it couples the usual elements connected with consumer surplus and
proﬁts with additional motives (perhaps more far-reaching) dealing with the
impact of the separation between ownership and control on resource (and
13
species) preservation.
Moreover, there remains the open question as to how a public agency
could regulate access to the commons, in presence of a single stable linear
feedback equilibrium and inﬁnitely many stable nonlinear feedback equilibria.
A plausible solution is proposed in the next section.
3.3 The regulated case
The model remains the same as for the resource dynamics (6) and ﬁrms’
technology. Instead, here the price p is exogenously given, being a policy
instrument in the hands of a public authority in charge of regulating access
to the common resource pool.
Accordingly, ﬁrm i’s instantaneous maximand writes
Mi (t) = [p− cqi (t) + θ] qi (t) . (28)
The problem is formally deﬁned as above, as ﬁrm i’s HJB equation is
ρVi (S) = max
qi

Mi +
∂Vi (S)
∂S
· (δS −Q)

(29)
Solving the game on the basis of the same procedure (or equivalently using
the method of the undetermined parameters), one obtains the following pair
of strategies:
qOLp =
σp
2c
; qLFp =
2cδ (2δ − ρ)S − (δ − nρ)σp
2cδ (2n− 1)
(30)
where (i) σp ≡ p+ θ; (ii) superscripts have the same meaning as above; and
(iii) subscript p indicates that the price of the ﬁnal good is being regulated.
While qOLp > 0 over the entire parameter space, q
LF
p > 0 for all
7
S >
(δ − nρ) σp
2cδ (2δ − ρ)
> 0 (31)
7La demonstration that indeed
(δ − nρ)σ
2cδ (2δ − ρ)
> 0
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The interesting implication of the price regulation is that, irrespective of
the information structure underpinning ﬁrms’ strategies, the residual steady
state resource stock is exactly the same:
Sp =
nqLF,OLp
δ
=
nσp
2cδ
(32)
which amounts to saying the following:
Proposition 5 Regulating price eliminates the multiplicity of stable feedback
equilibria, with the single linear feedback one surviving.
Moreover, (32) has two relevant implications that should equally attract
the attention of the authority:
• Sp monotonically increases in n: hence, the minimum residual stock
obtains in correspondence of n = 1. Recalling the dual interpreta-
tion of the nature of S, this fact has completely opposite implications
concerning the socially eﬃcient access to the commons.
• Sp monotonically increases in σ and therefore also in the extent of
delegation, θ: this reveals that including the individual instantaneous
harvest rates in the delegation contracts (or, adopting a CSR stance)
might or mighty not mean good news from the regulator’s standpoint,
again in view of the dual interpretation of the model as for the nature
of the state variable.
Be that as it may, the picture looks as in Figure 3, where again the arrows
indicate the dynamics of the state S and illustrate that qOLp is unstable while
qLFp is stable. Therefore, although they seem to yield the same steady state,
derives from the solution of the model in which ﬁrms are pure-proﬁt-seeking agents (i.e.,
θ = 0) and price is endogenously determined via the linear demand function instant by
instant.
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open-loop and feedback information structures are not equivalent at all. In
particular, the outcome engendered by qOLp can either drop to S = 0 or
exceed Sy, depending on the initial stock,
8 while the volume of the long-run
equilibrium state variable generated by qLFp is surely Sp = nσp/ (2cδ).
Figura 3 The regulated case
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To close the discussion carried out in this section, let’s focus our attention
onto the case in which S is a stock of waste. If so, then monopoly is the
8A peculiar and somewhat paradoxical feature of the case of waste removal is that if the
initial stock is suﬃciently low, ﬁrms might involuntarily drive to zero the residual stock
under myopic open-loop rules. Of course it is also true that if the inital stock is large
then the adoption of open-loop strategies might cause the waste stock to shoot up to plus
inﬁnity.
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socially eﬃcient structure, with
SNLT

n=1
= SLF

n=1
(33)
for obvious reasons, and
SLF

n=1
− Sp|n=1 =
ac− θ − p (1 + c)
2δc (1 + c)
> 0 (34)
for all
p < min

0,
ac− θ
1 + c

(35)
which entails that waste removal in monopoly should be subsidised if θ > ac.
4 Model II
Here, the contract based on (4) says that the ﬁrm attaches a negative weight
to the residual individual share of waste at the symmetric equilibrium. I will
focus on the regulated case only, as here - unlike what we have seen in model
I - the continuum of stable feedback equilibria arising with an unregulated
price survives the regime change. Hence, in what follows it is assumed that
p is an instrument in the regulator’s hands. Additionally, for reasons which
will become apparent below, I will conﬁne myself to the case in which the
state variable is a stock of waste (or, equivalently, the control of all ﬁrms has
been delegated to CSR managers).
Solving this game under feedback information yields inﬁnitely many sub-
game perfect strategies. This seemingly undesirable feature is driven by the
fact that the HJB equation is solved by the following two linear feedback
strategies:
qaII =
np (δ − ρ)− θ
2cn (δ − ρ)
; qbII =
n

npρ+ 4cδ2S + 2θ − δ (p+ 2cρS)

− θ
2cnδ (2n− 1)
(36)
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which produce two diﬀerent values of the residual waste stock in steady state:
SaII =
np (δ − ρ)− θ
2cδ (δ − ρ)
; SbII =
np (δ − nρ)− θ (2n− 1)
2cδ (δ − nρ)
(37)
The resulting graph replicates the picture appearing in Figure 1, with anal-
ogous properties. In particular, also here the ﬁrst (open-loop) solution is
unstable, while the second is stable. Of course, there are inﬁnitely many
nonlinear solutions, a subset of which is stable. This is portrayed in Figure
4, which, except for labels, is the same as in Figure 2.
Figure 4 Non linear solutions in the alternative model
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Hence, it is evident that regulation does not deliver uniqueness if the
delegation contract (or the CSR stance) chosen by ﬁrms relies on the residual
stock of waste. Yet, at a closer look, this scenario is not as discouraging as
it might look at ﬁrst glance. To grasp the intuition why it is not so, observe
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that
SaII − S
b
II =
(n− 1) (2δ − ρ) θ
2cδ (δ − ρ) (δ − nρ)
> 0 (38)
for all θ > 0. This simple result can be formulated as follows:
Lemma 6 If ﬁrms adopt a CSR stance based on a negative weight attached
to the individual share of residual waste stock, the stable feedback solution
yields a lower residual stock than the unstable (open-loop) one.
This fact has several relevant implications: (i) any stable nonlinear so-
lution is more desirable than the open-loop one; (ii) unlike what happens
in models dealing with natural resource exploitation, here the voracity ef-
fect (Tornell and Velasco, 1992; Lane and Tornell, 1996; Tornell and Lane,
1999) combined with feedback information is indeed desirable; and, more
importantly, both ST and SbII are monotonically decreasing in θ. That is,
Proposition 7 Intensifying the CSR component in the ﬁrm’s objective func-
tion brings about a decrease in the residual waste shock in any stable steady
state reached through feedback strategies.
It is worth noting that this is the opposite of what happens in the previous
model, where (32) measures the residual stock. Last but not least, one may
verify that for any θ > 0 there exists a unique level of the regulated price at
which SbII = 0:
p

SbII = 0

=
θ (2n− 1)
n (δ − nρ)
> 0 (39)
with
∂p

SbII = 0

∂n
=
[δ + 2n (n− 1) ρ] θ
n2 (δ − nρ)2
> 0. (40)
The same applies for any equilibrium generated by nonlinear feedback strate-
gies, whose residual stock is 
S = αSbII + (1− α)ST , α ∈ (0, 1) , as both SbII
and ST are linear in p. Moreover, () implies that, in monopoly, SaII = S
b
II and
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therefore the inﬁnitely many nonlinear equilibria vanish. These last ﬁndings
can be summarised as follows:
Corollary 8 To any stable feedback solution is associated a single price driv-
ing to zero the residual waste stock at equilibrium. This price takes its mini-
mum value in monopoly, where the stable linear solution is the only one being
relevant as the continuum of nonlinear equilibria disappears.
This suggests that the regulator may indeed rely on a single ﬁrm, granting
it the lowest price identiﬁed by p

SbII = 0

n=1
. This simultaneously solves
the problem associated with the multiplicity of equilibria and ensures full
removal at the lowest cost for society. Of course we are not compelled to
take this conclusion literally, in the sense that the correct implementation of
the price p

SbII = 0

requires knowing the exact values of the set of parame-
ters {n, δ, ρ, θ} . However, the sign of partial derivatives (39-40) represents a
reliable qualitative indication for the regulator.
5 Concluding remarks
In a nutshell, the foregoing analysis has shown that the acquired model de-
scribing the dynamic exploitation of a common pool renewable resource could
be reinterpreted as a game of waste removal, changing a few labels. Of course,
this involves a non trivial change of perspective, in particular when it comes
to the need of regulating an oligopoly game generating a continuum of feed-
back equilibria. Firms are either managerial or CSR entities - depending
on the interpretation being chosen - and their objective been deﬁned in two
diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst formulation stipulates that the relevant objective
contains proﬁts and output (or, the instantaneous individual volume of waste
removal). In this case, the adoption of feedback information generates a con-
tinuum of stable subgame perfect equilibria. The choice of regulating price
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sweeps away the continuum of equilibria engendered by nonlinear strategies,
leaving the regulator with a single stable linear feedback equilibrium whose
performance depends on the price level and the number of ﬁrms being granted
access to the commons. Hence, there appears that, combining appropriately
price and entry regulation, the public authority can indeed outperform the
most favourable unregulated feedback equilibrium in terms of the residual
resource stock at the steady state.
The second formulation assumes that managerial or CSR incentives are
based on a combination of proﬁts and the ﬁrm’s individual share of the
residual stock of the state variable. If the latter measures the volume of waste,
the model shows that, in correspondence of any stable feedback equilibrium,
there exists a price at which the residual stock is indeed nil. Moreover, such
a price decreases monotonically in the number of ﬁrms. Hence, the regulator
may restrict access to a single ﬁrm and adopt the lowest of all such prices,
thereby attaining the desired goal at the lowest possible tariﬀ.
Needless to say, the foregoing material does not exhaust the analysis of
this topic. In addition to the obvious extensions accounting for the aforemen-
tioned alternative delegation contracts based upon market shares (Jansen et
al., 2007; Ritz, 2008) or comparative performance evaluation (Salas-Fumas,
1992; Miller and Pazgal, 2001), a plausible and promising one is that in which
either control variables or the stock implies polluting emissions. The ﬁrst
possibility is plausible if the state refers to a natural resource, and produc-
tion based on harvest is polluting the environment; the second is intuitively
related to a scenario in which the state variable is a stock of waste. This
extension would enrich the currently scant literature modelling the simulta-
neous presence of resource extraction (or stock removal) and environmental
damage or global warming (cf. Lambertini and Leitmann, 2013; and Lam-
bertini, 2016b).
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